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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act (Fees
Act)" to promote more vigorous enforcement of the civil rights laws
by attracting competent legal counsel to represent civil rights
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The Fees Act provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681], or title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d], the court, in its discretion, may allow the
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plaintiffs.2 To achieve this goal the Fees Act allows courts to award
attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases.' The
statute, however, entails an inherent tension: the Fees Act's pri-
mary aim of compensating prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys "'for all
time reasonably expended on a matter' ,,4 conflicts with the desire
to prevent windfalls to attorneys. 5 This conflict is especially keen
when a civil rights plaintiff only partially prevails," because the
court then must determine whether a fees award should compen-
sate for time spent on unsuccessful claims.
Courts initially addressing this issue developed three distinct
standards. One line of cases held that attorneys should be compen-
sated only for time spent pursuing successful claims.7 Another
group of courts held that attorneys should be compensated for
2. The legislative history asserts that the civil rights laws "depend heavily on private
enforcement," and refers to fees awards as "an essential remedy if private citizens are to
have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate" congressional policies that underlie these laws.
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. A
party seeking to enforce these rights, "if successful, 'should ordinarily recover an attorney's
fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'" Id. at 4 (quoting
Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
3. See supra note 1.
4. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6 (citations omitted).
5. Id. The Senate report states that prevailing plaintiffs should receive awards that are
"adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys."
Id. One commentator refers to this concern as the fear of a "blank check." Interview with
James Blumstein, Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University School of Law, in Nashville,
Tennessee (Oct., 1984). Defendants fear that an attorney may write himself a blank check in
a strong case by padding his bill with many hours that involve meritless or questionable
claims. Id.
6. A "partially prevailing plaintiff" either does not succeed on all claims asserted or
fails to receive all remedies sought. The legislative history indicates that the Fees Act still
considers these parties as "prevailing" within the statutory definition:
The phrase "prevailing party" is not intended to be limited to the victor only after
entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits. It would also include a
litigant who succeeds even if the case is concluded prior to a full evidentiary hearing
before a judge or jury. If the litigation terminates by consent decree, for example, it
would be proper to award counsel fees.. . . A "prevailing" party should not be penal-
ized for seeking an out-of-court settlement, thus helping to lessen docket congestion.
Similarly, after a complaint is filed, a defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful
practice. A court should still award fees even though it might conclude, as a matter of
equity, that no formal relief, such as an injunction, is needed.
H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976) (citations omitted) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT].
The Senate report states that an award may be appropriate if a party "has prevailed on
an important matter in the course of litigation, even when he ultimately does not prevail on
all issues." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. The cases cited approvingly in the Senate
report also support this broad definition of prevailing party. See infra notes 32-44 and ac-
companying text.
7. See cases cited infra note 46.
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time expended on all nonfrivolous claims, regardless of whether
the claims were successful at trial.8 A third approach required
courts to consider the relationship between the unsuccessful claims
and the success achieved, and to reduce the fees award only when
unsuccessful claims were truly distinct from the successful claim or
claims." In Hensley v. Eckerhart ° the United State Supreme
Court had the opportunity to resolve this dispute and to establish
a standard for determining the fees award when a plaintiff prevails
only partially.1" The Court held that the proper determination of
the fees award requires a court to examine the relationship be-
tween successful and unsuccessful claims.1 2 The award should com-
pensate for unsuccessful claims only if they share a "common core
of facts or . . . related legal theories" with the successful claim.13
Furthermore, the court should focus on the overall success
achieved and grant an award that is reasonable in relation to the
results obtained. 4
Although the Hensley decision settled this issue to some ex-
tent by adopting a standard for determining fees awards for par-
tially prevailing plaintiffs, the standard proved to be so flexible
that Hensley has created more problems than the decision has re-
solved. The disparity among lower courts over whether to compen-
sate for unsuccessful claims has continued, and courts rely on
Hensley as support for completely divergent results in similar fact
situations. The purpose of this Recent Development is to propose a
procedure and standard that will resolve the Fees Act's conflict
more effectively than the Hensley decision. Part II focuses on the
legal background leading to Hensley and examines the Hensley
opinion. Part III discusses the subsequent decisions that have at-
tempted to apply the Hensley standard. Part IV analyzes Hensley
and the subsequent decisions in light of the legislative history and
purposes of the Fees Act. Part IV also suggests a procedure and
standard that will resolve the problems that Hensley and the Fees
Act present. Part V concludes that courts can best serve congres-
sional intent by focusing on the legitimacy of the claims asserted
8. See cases cited infra note 56.
9. See cases cited infra note 65.
10. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
11. Id. at 426. Plaintiffs prevailed on five of six claims asserted. See infra notes 81-84
and accompanying text.
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and by compensating attorneys for all time reasonably expended in
pursuing legitimate claims.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History of the Fees Act
The catalyst of the Fees Act was the Supreme Court's ruling
in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,15 which re-
affirmed the "American Rule" on attorney's fees and held that
only Congress can authorize exceptions that allow fee shifting
among litigants.1" Congress responded immediately.17 In the area
of civil rights, Congress recognized that a vast majority of plaintiffs
cannot afford legal counsel.18 By passing the Fees Act, Congress
hoped to ensure effective access to the judicial system for all vic-
tims of civil rights violations. 9 Congress also realized that poten-
tial liability for attorney's fees might deter civil rights violations.
The "private attorneys general" would enable vigorous enforce-
ment of civil rights legislation. 0 Congress designed the Fees Act to
prevent civil rights laws from becoming "mere hollow
pronouncements."'
The legislative history provides guidelines for courts in award-
ing attorney's fees under the Fees Act. The Senate report stated
that the fees award should be "adequate to attract competent
counsel, but [should] not produce windfalls to attorneys. '22 In
15. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
16. Id. at 247, 263-64, 270-71. The Court reaffirmed the traditional "American Rule"
that attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable by the prevailing litigant; only by "legisla-
tive guidance" may the judiciary "reallocate the burdens of litigation." Id. at 247.
17. The Senate report states that the purpose of the Fees Act "is to remedy anoma-
lous gaps in our civil rights laws created by the United States Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion" in Alyeska Pipeline. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. These anomalous gaps made
awards of fees "suddenly unavailable in the most fundamental civil rights cases." Id. at 4.
Congress authorized fee shifting in private suits under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1982). Since 1964 "every major civil rights law . . . has
included, or has been amended to include, one or more fee provisions." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 3. Prior to the Alyeska Pipeline decision, lower courts "had drawn the
obvious analogy between the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts and these modern civil rights
acts, and, following Congressional recognition. . . of the 'private attorney general' concept,
were exercising their traditional equity powers to award attorneys' fees under early civil
rights laws as well." Id. at 4 (footnote omitted). According to the Report, the Fees Act "is an
appropriate response to the Alyeska decision." Id.
18. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
19. Id.
20. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4.
21. Id. at 6; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
22. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
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computing the fee, courts should compensate prevailing parties' at-
torneys "'for all time reasonably expended on a matter.' "23 Be-
yond these general guidelines, the Senate report cited several cases
in which courts had awarded attorney's fees pursuant to other fee
shifting statutes. These cases were to govern the determination of
fees awards under the Fees Act.24
Congress referred to Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc. 2 5 in the legislative history as the standard bearer for fee deter-
minations.26 In Johnson the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit attempted to reverse a lower court trend of
awarding nominal fees without explanation. 7 The fees question
arose in a Title VII challenge to defendant's discharge of plaintiff-
employee.2 8 The Fifth Circuit enumerated twelve factors for lower
courts to consider in determining fees awards.2 9 Apart from em-
phasizing that the goal of fee shifting statutes is to provide liti-
gants with competent counsel and not to profit attorneys,"0 the
23. Id. (citations omitted).
24. Id. The report stated:
It is intended that the amount of fees awarded... be governed by the same stan-
dards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation... and not be
reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in nature. The appropriate
standards, see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), are
correctly applied in such cases as Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal.
1974); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 9444 (C.D. Cal.
1974); and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483
(W.D.N.C. 1975).
Id. The Senate cited these cases as governing because they resulted in fees awards that were
"adequate to attract competent counsel, but which [did] not produce windfalls to attor-
neys." Id.
25. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
26. See supra note 24.
27. 488 F.2d at 717; see E. LARSON, FEDERAL CouRT AWARDS OF ATrORNEY'S FEES 117
(1981).
28. Prior to passage of the Fees Act, the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other modem civil
rights acts authorized fee shifting. See supra note 17.
29. 488 F.2d at 717-19. The twelve factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee
is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations that the client or circumstances impose; (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Id.
The Johnson court took these factors from the American Bar Association's Code of
Professional Responsibility. Id. at 719. Attempting to aid appellate review, see id. at 717,
the court declared that a failure to consider these factors would constitute an abuse of dis-
cretion, id. at 720.
30. Id. at 719. The Johnson court also called for attorneys to use their best efforts to
settle a fee request. Id. at 720. "Ideally, of course, litigants will settle the amount of a fee."
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Johnson court failed to explain the appropriate method of apply-
ing these twelve factors.
To provide guidelines for the proper application of the John-
son criteria, Congress cited in the legislative history three cases in
which courts correctly applied these factors." In Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher 2 the court recognized the inherent tension in fee shifting
statutes"3 and decided to apply the lodestar method of computa-
tion, which calls for the multiplication of the number of hours ex-
pended by the appropriate hourly fee. 4 The court found that this
calculation provided an objective starting point for determining
the proper fees award. 5 Turning to the issue of unsuccessful
claims, the court refused to disallow hours spent pursuing the un-
successful motion because plaintiffs' attorneys not only had ob-
tained a significant concession, but also had not "manufactur[ed]
legal services in constructing their ...motion." 6 The attorneys
had substantially advanced their clients' interests.3 7
In Davis v. County of Los Angeles 8 plaintiffs prevailed in re-
quiring the Los Angeles Fire Department to undertake an affirma-
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
31. See supra note 24.
32. 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436
U.S. 547 (1978). Plaintiffs, the primary student newspaper of Stanford University and mem-
bers of its staff, filed suit requesting that the court declare illegal and unconstitutional a
search of the newspaper's offices. Id. at 125-26. Plaintiffs obtained a declaratory judgment
and moved for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 136. The court recognized that defendants
were "respected members of the community [and] anticipate[d] that this decision [would]
be honored and that an injunction [would be] unnecessary." Id. The court, therefore, re-
fused to grant a preliminary injunction. Id. In a subsequent proceeding, Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), the court calculated the appropriate fee award. This subse-
quent proceeding is the case cited with approval in the legislative history. See supra note
24.
33. 64 F.R.D. at 681. The court stated that it must avoid "the Scylla of simply ac-
cepting the attorneys' account of the value" of legal services provided while also avoiding
"the Charybdis of decreasing reasonable fees because the attorneys conducted the litigation
more as an act pro bono publico than as an effort at securing a large monetary return." Id.
(citations omitted).
34. Id. at 682-83, 684.
35. Id. The court cited Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit declared that this figure "provides the only reasonably objective basis for val-
uing an attorney's services." Id. at 167. Although the calculation of this figure does not end
the inquiry, the figure does provide an objective starting point. See id.
36. Stanford Daily, 64 F.R.D. at 684.
37. Id.
38. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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tive action program."9 The plaintiffs, however, either were unsuc-
cessful or did not litigate certain other issues.40 The court held that
neither the exclusion of nor a defeat on these issues was "legally
relevant in determining the fees award. 41 The court did not ex-
clude hours spent on these issues from the lodestar calculation and
awarded fees "for all time reasonably expended in pursuit of the
ultimate result achieved. 4 2 Similarly, in the school desegregation
case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,5
the court awarded compensation for all hours expended, despite
plaintiffs' losses on "certain minor contentions. '44
B. Pre-Hensley Interpretations of the Fees Act
Prior to the Hensley decision, three different standards for de-
termining the fee awards of partially prevailing plaintiffs emerged
from the circuit courts.45 One group of courts held that attorney's
fees should be based only on work performed on successful
claims.46 In Nadeau v. Helgemoe47 the United States Court of Ap-
39. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9088 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
40. Davis, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9444, at 5049. The court did not explain the
content of these issues.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
44. Id. at 484. The minor contentions regarded the adequacy of physical plants, the
adequacy of equipment, and the quality of teachers. Id.
45. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1983). In addition to the split between
circuit courts, disagreement sometimes arose from different panels of the same court. Com-
pare Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978) (basing award only on successful
claims) with Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46 (lst Cir. 1979) (allowing fees award for
unsuccessful attempt to broaden remedies) and compare Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577
(7th Cir. 1980) (basing award only on successful claims) with Sherkow v. Wisconsin, 630
F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1980) (basing award on all nonfrivolous claims). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit attempted to resolve the conflict between its panels in
Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981), ruling that a court
should distinguish between unsuccessful issues that are merely aspects of a larger, successful
claim and unsuccessful claims that are independent claims. See infra note 77 and accompa-
nying text.
46. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1982); Busche v. Burkee,
649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1981); Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980); Sethy v. Ala-
meda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1979); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275
(1st Cir. 1978); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978).
47. 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978). In the initial proceeding the court awarded plaintiffs,
inmates being held at their own request in protective custody in the New Hampshire State
Prison, additional access to the prison's library facilities, but denied plaintiffs relief on vari-
ous other claims. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976), modified, 561 F.2d
411 (1st Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs had asserted that the deprivation of privileges and the condi-
tions of confinement subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment, that confinement
under such disparate conditions violated plaintiffs' rights to equal protection of the law, and
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peals for the First Circuit first considered whether a plaintiff who
is not successful on every claim is a "prevailing party" entitled to
an award under the Fees Act.48 The court stated that a plaintiff is
a prevailing party for the purposes of the Fees Act if the plaintiff
succeeds on "any significant issue in litigation which achieves some
benefit the part[y] sought. ' 49 This broad definition of prevailing
party notwithstanding, the First Circuit maintained that the fees
award should compensate only for work performed on issues in
which the plaintiffs succeeded.50 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit adopted a similar approach in Hughes
v. Repko.51 Recognizing that the lodestar method52 is the proper
first step in calculating the fees award, the court found the more
important question to be what services a court should properly in-
clude in the lodestar calculation. 53 The Third Circuit maintained
that a plaintiff is not a prevailing party to the extent that he has
been unsuccessful.4 Because the Fees Act provides for fees awards
only for prevailing parties, the court concluded that it should in-
clude only hours "reasonably supportive" of successful claims in
the lodestar calculation. 5
that defendants violated plaintiffs' rights to exercise their religion and to have access to the
courts by unnecessarily restricting plaintiffs' access to religious services and the law library.
423 F. Supp. 1260. The First Circuit reversed in part, 561 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1977), and on
remand, the parties entered into a consent decree that resulted in considerable improve-
ment for the plaintiffs. 581 F.2d at 277.
48. 581 F.2d at 278.
49. Id. at 278-79. The court held that victory on the library access issue "was signifi-
cant enough . . . for plaintiffs to be considered prevailing parties." Id. at 279. The First
Circuit also recognized that the legislative history required a consideration of any vindica-
tion of rights through a consent decree even if plaintiffs failed to obtain formal relief. Id.;
see SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. The district court had failed to consider plaintiffs'
success in both instances. Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 280.
50. 581 F.2d at 279. In Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897-98
(9th Cir. 1979), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted this same
approach, quoting from Nadeau. See also Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 910, 914 (9th
Cir. 1982) (reaffirming the Sethy standard).
51. 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978). Plaintiffs prevailed on their claim that because of
their race defendant had not leased an apartment to them. The plaintiffs, however, failed on
their claims of discrimination and conspiracy against defendant's husband, and failed to
receive punitive damages. Id. at 485.
52. See supra text accompanying note 34.
53. 578 F.2d at 486.
54. Id. at 487. The court asserted: "Any other interpretation would run counter to the
spirit of the [Fees] Act provision that attorney's fees should be awarded to the 'prevailing'
party." Id.
55. Id. The court further limited the fees award by instructing the district court to
consider "not only the number of hours actually devoted to the successful claims, but also
whether it was reasonably necessary to spend that number of hours." Id.
[Vol. 39:359
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A second line of cases held that the fees award for a partially
prevailing plaintiff should be based on all nonfrivolous claims, re-
gardless of whether these claims were successful.56 In Northcross v.
Board of Education5 7 plaintiffs had prevailed only partially in
their desegregation fight, and the district court had reduced the
fees award to eliminate compensation for the matters on which
plaintiffs did not prevail. 58 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit rejected this approach. The Sixth Circuit as-
serted that once the court has determined that plaintiffs are "pre-
vailing parties," plaintiffs are entitled to recover fees for "'all time
reasonably spent on a matter.' ",51 The Sixth Circuit maintained
that whether plaintiffs' attorneys spent time researching issues
which were "ultimately unproductive, rejected by the court, or
mooted by intervening events" was irrelevant. Furthermore, reduc-
ing awards for such time would discourage "innovative and vigor-
ous lawyering in a changing area of the law."'60 The court recog-
nized that Congress mandated the broadest remedies available to
enforce the civil rights laws" and found that courts could best fol-
low this mandate by encouraging attorneys to promote their cli-
ents' interests to the fullest extent possible in good faith.6 2 The
court also noted practical difficulties with dissecting time spent on
successful and unsuccessful claims.63 For these reasons, the court
The Third Circuit also considered the district court's reduction of the figure obtained
from the initial lodestar calculation. The district court had decided that because plaintiffs
failed on more than two-thirds of the claims asserted, see supra note 51, the court should
reduce the lodestar figure by two-thirds, 578 F.2d at 486. The Third Circuit held that the
lower court's approach had no "rational basis" because there "is no necessary percentage
relationship between the number of claims and contentions presented in a lawsuit and the
lawyer time spent on each." Id.
56. See, e.g., Sherkow v. Wisconsin, 630 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1980); Northcross v. Board
of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); Brown v. Bathke,
588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978).
57. 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
58. 611 F.2d at 631.
59. Id. at 636; see also Sherkow v. Wisconsin, 630 F.2d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 1980); Brown
v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 1978) (stating that the legislative history calls for
compensating an attorney for all time reasonably expended). For the legislative history sup-
porting this contention, see supra text accompanying note 23.
60. 611 F.2d at 636.
61. Id.; see also Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d at 636 (stating that Congress intended a
liberal standard for determining fees awards).
62. 611 F.2d at 636.
63. The Sixth Circuit particularly criticized the lower court for "decimating the total
hours claimed with arbitrary percentages." Id. Without going into further detail, the court
stated:
Suffice it to say ... Congress has mandated that a prevailing party's attorney should
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:359
held that a prevailing plaintiff should receive compensation for all
hours reasonably expended on the case, including "unsuccessful re-
search or litigation, unless the positions asserted [were] frivolous
or in bad faith."'"
A third approach required courts to consider the relationship
between the unsuccessful claims and the ultimate success achieved
when determining whether to compensate for time spent on unsuc-
cessful claims. 5 Recognizing that Congress intended the Fees Act
to compensate attorneys for "all time reasonably expended,
6 6
these courts agreed with the Northcross mandate that time spent
on unsuccessful claims should not be disallowed automatically.
6 7
These courts also agreed that frivolous claims should not be in-
cluded in the fees calculation,68 but went beyond the Northcross
approach by requiring further analysis to determine when unsuc-
cessful claims may be included. In Jones v. Diamond69 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit emphasized that com-
plex civil rights litigation necessarily involves overlapping issues"0
and that attorneys must explore fully every aspect of the case to
represent their clients adequately.1 Therefore, in determining
whether time spent on an unsuccessful claim should be included in
be compensated "as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client,
for all time reasonably expended on a matter." We know of no "traditional" method of
billing whereby an attorney offers a discount based upon his or her failure to prevail on
"issues or parts of issues."
Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also repudiated any
"mechanical division" of hours spent on successful and unsuccessful claims because such a
distinction ignores "the interrelated nature of many prevailing and nonprevailing claims."
Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d at 637 n.5.
64. 611 F.2d at 636. The Sixth Circuit noted that the lower court may reduce the
number of hours claimed for "duplication, padding or bad faith." Id.; see also Brown, 588
F.2d at 637 (asserting that time spent on frivolous claims is not time "reasonably
expended").
65. See, e.g., Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981); Jones
v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (en banc); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980).
66. See, e.g., Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1381 (5th Cir. 1981); Gurule v. Wilson,
635 F.2d 782, 793 (10th Cir. 1980).
67. See, e.g., Jones, 636 F.2d at 1382; Gurule, 635 F.2d at 793.
68. See, e.g., Jones, 636 F.2d at 1382; Gurule, 635 F.2d at 794.
69. 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs successfully obtained injunctive relief be-
cause the court concluded that the conditions of plaintiffs' confinement violated constitu-
tional guarantees. Id. at 1367. The Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed the lower court's judg-
ment denying the class representative and six individual plaintiffs monetary damages. Id.
70. Id. at 1382; see also Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(noting that a case often involves various legal theories).
71. 636 F.2d at 1382.
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calculating the fees award, lower courts must "consider the rela-
tionship of the claims that resulted in judgment with the claims
that were rejected and the contribution, if any, made to success by
the investigation and prosecution of the entire case. '7 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ad-
vanced a similar standard in Gurule v. Wilson.73 The Gurule court
recognized that attorneys should not be penalized for litigating un-
successful claims that were "part and parcel" of the success
achieved.74 The Tenth Circuit noted, however, that a court could
reduce a fees award for time spent on "substantial[ly] separate"
issues that were unsuccessful.7 5 In Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler
Manufacturing Co. 76 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit also distinguished between "independent" unsuc-
cessful claims and unsuccessful claims that were "mere aspects of
a larger claim. '77 The Seventh Circuit held that fees awards should
be reduced only for "independent" unsuccessful claims.78
C. Hensley v. Eckerhart
Because the courts of appeals had adopted varying standards
for determining a fees award for partially prevailing plaintiffs, the
Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict in Hensley v.
Eckerhart.79 In Hensley plaintiffs had challenged the constitution-
ality of treatment and conditions at the Forensic Unit of Fulton
72. Id.
73. 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 794 (citing with approval Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir.
1979)); see also Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (asserting that
no reduction is appropriate when the issue is "part and parcel" of one matter).
75. 635 F.2d at 794.
76. 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981).
77. Id. at 165 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Seventh Circuit distinguished the
Syvock case from Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981), and Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980), in which the court had limited
the fees awards to successful claims, see supra note 46 and accompanying text. The plaintiff
in Syvock succeeded in establishing defendant's liability, but failed to prove that defendant
had acted willfully and that plaintiff had mitigated his damages. 665 F.2d at 165. The Sev-
enth Circuit considered these unsuccessful claims to be "mere aspects of a larger claim" in
which the plaintiff did succeed. Id. The plaintiff in Busche had failed to prove two of three
alleged due process violations, and the plaintiff in Muscare had failed to prove that a regu-
lation was unconstitutional although he had successfully proved that he had been denied
procedural due process. Id. at 163-65. The Seventh Circuit considered the unsuccessful
claims in these cases to be "independent" from the successful claims. Id. at 165.
78. 665 F.2d at 165; see also Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892 n.18 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (stating that reduction is appropriate only when unsuccessful issues are "truly
fractionable").
79. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
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State Hospital in Fulton, Missouri.80 The district court held that
an involuntarily committed patient has a constitutional right to
minimally adequate treatment and found constitutional violations
in five of six general areas.8' Plaintiffs then filed a request for at-
torney's fees under the Fees Act.82 The district court determined
that plaintiffs were prevailing parties and refused to eliminate
from the award the hours spent on unsuccessful claims.8 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed. 4
The Supreme Court's majority opinion initially analyzed the
legislative history of the Fees Act,85 but found that it provided no
"definitive answer as to the proper standard for setting a fee award
where the plaintiff has achieved only limited success."8 The Court
acknowledged that a plaintiff must be a prevailing party, but de-
clared that the "generous formulation" of this phrase87 "brings the
plaintiff only across the statutory threshold. It remains for the dis-
80. Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of all persons involuntarily confined at the Foren-
sic Unit, which housed persons dangerous to themselves or others. Plaintiffs named officials
at the Forensic Unit and members of the Missouri Mental Health Commission as defend-
ants. Id. at 426.
Plaintiffs originally filed suit in 1972 in a three count complaint. Count I challenged the
constitutionality of treatment; count II challenged the placement of patients in the maxi-
mum security building without procedural due process; count III sought compensation for
patients who performed labor for maintenance of the institution. Id. The parties resolved
count II by consent decree in 1973. Count III became moot in August 1974 when defendants
began compensating patients for labor performed. In April 1975 plaintiffs voluntarily dis-
missed the suit and filed a new two count complaint challenging the constitutionality of
treatment and seeking back pay for patients. In July 1976 plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed
the back pay count. In August 1977 plaintiffs filed an amended one count complaint specify-
ing the conditions that allegedly violated the patients' constitutional rights. Id. at 426-27.
81. See Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908, 915-28 (W.D. Mo. 1979). The court
found that plaintiffs': (1) physical environment; (2) individual treatment plans; (3) general
environment; (4) visitation, telephone, and mail privileges; and (5) seclusion and restraint
guidelines were inadequate. With regard to staffing, however, the court found that staffing
levels were minimally adequate. Id.; see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 427-28 & n.1.
82. Plaintiffs' four attorneys claimed that they worked 2985 hours and sought pay-
ment at rates varying from $40 to $65 per hour. The fee request included the period from
January 1975 through the end of the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 428.
83. Id. The district court, however, did not grant the entire request. The court re-
duced the number of hours of one attorney by 30% to account for his inexperience and his
failure to keep contemporaneous records. The district court also declined plaintiffs' request
for an upward adjustment. Id. at 428-29.
84. Eckerhart v. Hensley, 664 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
85. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429-31. For an analysis of the legislative history and cases
cited therein, see supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
86. 461 U.S. at 431.
87. Id. at 433. The Court cited Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.
1978), for the broad definition of prevailing party. See supra text accompanying note 49
(discussing Nadeau's definition).
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trict court to determine what fee is 'reasonable.' "81 The Court held
that the most useful starting point for making this determination
is the objective lodestar figure.89 The calculation of the lodestar,
however, "does not end the inquiry;" other considerations may
compel a court to adjust the fee award. 0 The Supreme Court as-
serted that when a plaintiff has prevailed only partially, a crucial
factor in making this determination is the "results obtained."' By
limiting awards to prevailing parties, the Fees Act requires courts
to treat claims that are unrelated" to the successful result as if the
party had not raised the claims.93 A district court, therefore, must
assess the relationship between successful and unsuccessful claims
because "work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have
been 'expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.' """ If
the claims involve "a common core of facts or [arel based on re-
lated legal theories," however, a reduction in the fee award is inap-
propriate. 5 In these cases courts must not attempt to divide hours
on a claim-by-claim basis as if the lawsuit were a series of discrete
claims. Rather, courts must focus on the "significance of the over-
all relief" and consider the relationship between the extent of suc-
cess and the amount of the fees award, awarding only an amount
that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained."8
88. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
89. Id. For an explanation of the lodestar method of calculation, see supra text accom-
panying note 34.
90. 461 U.S. at 434.
91. Id.
92. The Court admitted that no certain method exists for determining the relationship
among claims, id. at 437 n.12, and offered only rough guidelines. According to the Court, if a
plaintiff fails on a claim that is "distinct in all respects" from his successful claims, the
lower court should exclude the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim. If a suit, however,
involves related claims a reduction simply because the court did not adopt each contention
is inappropriate for a plaintiff who has won "substantial relief." Id. at 440. "[T]he extent of
a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor . "Id.
93. Id. at 435.
94. Id. (quoting Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 5049).
95. 461 U.S. at 435.
96. Id. at 435, 440. For example, the Court stated that the fees award based on 2557
hours may have been reasonable in this case because of the substantial relief obtained. An
award, however, based on the claimed hours would have been excessive if plaintiffs had
prevailed on only one of the six claims. Id. at 436.
The Supreme Court maintained that a district court necessarily has discretion in
awarding fees because the lower court has a superior understanding of the litigation. In
exercising that discretion, however, a district court must make clear that it has considered
the relationship between the amount of the fees award and the success achieved. Id. at 437.
Because the district court in this case had not given proper attention to this relationship,
the Court vacated the award and remanded the case. Id. at 438, 440.
Chief Justice Burger concurred. The Chief Justice emphasized that a party who seeks
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In a separate opinion9 7 Justice Brennan stressed the delicate
balance inherent in the Fees Act"8 and accused the majority of an
imbalanced analysis. Justice Brennan found that the majority em-
phasized those aspects of discretion necessary to prevent "wind-
falls" to attorneys without giving proper attention to the need to
ensure that competent counsel will represent civil rights plaintiffs
who have bona fide claims.99 To ensure that competent counsel is
available, fees awards must compensate attorneys as fully as mar-
ket standards allow. 100 Turning to the majority's newly enunicated
standard, Justice Brennan agreed that the relationship between re-
sults and fees is a necessary factor.101 Justice Brennan, however,
disapproved of too much reliance on this factor because work on
unrelated claims often develops facts that are intertwined. Justice
Brennan also indicated that determining how much time an attor-
ney devoted to which claim may be impossible.10
In addition to these theoretical objections to the majority's ap-
proach, Justice Brennan expressed concern that the majority seri-
to shift the burden of fees to his opponent "must keep records in sufficient detail that a
neutral judge can make a fair evaluation" of the "reasonable fees to be allowed." Id. at 441
(Burger, C. J., concurring).
97. Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan's
opinion, dissenting in part.
98. 461 U.S. at 443-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); see supra notes 4-5 and ac-
companying text and infra note 104.
99. Id. at 444 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
100. Id. at 447 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
Justice Brennan also argued that full compensation should include compensation for
the time value of money and any risk factors involved. He stated:
[T]he Court expressly approves consideration of the full range of Johnson ... factors.
.. . If the rate used in calculating the fee does not already include some factor for risk
or the time value of money, it ought to be enhanced by some percentage figure. By the
same token, attorneys need not obtain "excellent" results to merit a fully compensatory
fee.
Id. at 449 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted); see also Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 902 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring) (reaffirming view that Congress "has
clearly indicated that the risk of not prevailing" is a proper basis for an upward
adjustment).
101. Id. at 448 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Brennan recognized that the
extent of the plaintiff's success is an important factor: "Any system for awarding attorney's
fees that did not take account of the relationship between results and fees would fail to
accomplish Congress' goal of checking insubstantial litigation." Id.
102. Id. Justice Brennan stated:
For instance, in taking a deposition of a state official, plaintiffs' counsel may find it
necessary to cover a range of territory that includes both the successful and the unsuc-
cessful claims. It is sometimes virtually impossible to determine how much time was
devoted to one category or the other, and the incremental time required to pursue both
claims rather than just one is likely to be small.
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ously erred in vacating the fees award and in dooming the parties
to further litigation.103 According to Justice Brennan, unless the
award is so low that it inadequately compensates attorneys or is so
high that the award constitutes an unmistakable windfall, the
award "substantially accomplishes Congress' objectives. More ex-
acting review . . . frustrates rather than advances the policies of
[the Fees Act]."' 04 Justice Brennan was concerned that regular ap-
pellate scrutiny of fees awards will replace the Fees Act's straight-
forward command with a growing body of judicial doctrine that
will lead to further confusion and less certain standards. 05 Simi-
larly, protracted litigation over fees, and other obstacles to prevail-
ing parties who seek reasonable attorney's fees, likely will discour-
age competent counsel from representing civil rights plaintiffs,
especially those plaintiffs with "less-than-certain prospects for suc-
cess."106 The Court's holding, according to Justice Brennan, invites
"losing defendants to engage in what must be one of the least so-
cially productive types of litigation imaginable: appeals from
awards of attorney's fees . . . .,,o Despite Justice Brennan's ob-
jections, however, the majority in Hensley chose to resolve the dis-
pute over the proper determination of a fees award for a partially
prevailing plaintiff by directing lower courts to focus on the overall
success achieved by the action and to consider the relationship be-
tween unsuccessful and successful claims, looking especially for a
common core of facts and related legal theories. The recent cases
that follow illustrate lower courts' attempts to apply this new
standard.
103. Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). "I fear that the sudden appearance of
a new Supreme Court precedent in this area will unjustifiably provoke new litigation and
prolong old litigation over attorney's fees." Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 455 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan
recognized that the inherent tension of the Fees Act requires a delicately balanced standard.
"If [plaintiffs'] attorneys . . . do not expect to receive full compensation for their efforts
when they are successful, or if they feel they can 'lard' winning cases with additional work
solely to augment their fees, the balance struck by [the Fees Act] goes awry." Id. at 447
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
105. Id. at 455 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Brennan characterized this
appellate review as "a vast body of artificial, judge-made doctrine, with its own arcane pro-
cedures, which like a Frankenstein's monster meanders its well-intentioned way through the
legal landscape leaving waste and confusion (not to mention circuit splits) in its wake." Id.
106. Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Brennan observed that "from
prevailing plaintiffs' point of view, appellate litigation of attorney's fee issues increases the
delay, uncertainty, and expense of bringing a civil rights case .. . . The longer litigation
proceeds. . . the more pressure plaintiffs and their attorneys may feel to compromise their
claims or simply to give up." Id. at 456.
107. Id. at 442 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
A. Cases Reducing Fees Award for Unsuccessful Claims
In Mandhare v. W.S. LaFargue Elementary School'0 a school
librarian who was denied reappointment brought suit under Title
VII alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin.1°' Plain-
tiff sought reinstatement, back pay, and general equitable relief.110
The court found indications of unlawful discrimination,"' but or-
dered only reinstatement and reduced the fees award accord-
ingly.1 2 The court reasoned that Hensley allowed the court to
choose between identifying and excluding specific hours or simply
reducing the fees award to account for limited success. The court
opted for the latter and reduced the fees award by twenty-five per-
cent because plaintiff "did not prevail on that significant claim for
relief, back pay, nor did she prevail on the request for general and
equitable relief.""'
In Leverett v. Town of Limon" 4 landowners challenged a
newly passed zoning ordinance and sought an injunction on proce-
dural and substantive due process grounds.1 5 Plaintiffs succeeded
only on the procedural due process claim." 6 Addressing the attor-
ney's fees issue, the court stated that plaintiffs had "two distinct
108. 605 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. La. 1985).
109. Id. at 239. Plaintiff was of Asian origin. Defendant Lafourche Parish School
Board employed plaintiff as a librarian for W.S. LaFargue Elementary School during the
1980-81 school year. The elementary school served students from kindergarten through sec-
ond grade. Because plaintiff's heavy accent created communication problems with the ele-
mentary school children, the Superintendent of Schools for Lafourche Parish recommended
plaintiff's transfer to a junior high school. The school board did not heed the recommenda-
tion and voted not to appoint plaintiff for the 1981-82 school year. Id. at 239-40.
110. Title VII specifically provides these remedies to the victims of unlawful employ-
ment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
111. The court noted that the termination of plaintiff's appointment was the first time
that the school board had not approved a recommendation of the superintendent.
Mandhare, 605 F. Supp. at 240. The school board failed to mention plaintiff's name in a
public session. The board stated that it accepted all recommendations "except the appoint-
ment of lp;" the reference was to plaintiff. Id. The court further found that plaintiff was
"eminently qualified." Id. at 241. The court also rejected the argument that plaintiff's heavy
accent caused a communication problem that necessitated terminating her employment. Be-
cause the school board would have transferred plaintiff to a junior high school, plaintiff
"was not being considered for a position which would require such communication" as story-
telling and introduction to the library. Id. at 240-41.
112. Id. at 243.
113. Id.
114. 567 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1983).
115. Id. at 472. The ordinance limited the number of cattle that plaintiffs could keep
at their clinic. Id. at 474.
116. Id. at 475.
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claims" for which they sought "two distinct remedies.' 1 17 The
court found that plaintiffs were "prevailing parties" only on the
successful procedural due process claim. In determining the fees
award, therefore, the court excluded time spent on the unsuccess-
ful substantive due process claim."18
In Ryan v. Raytheon Data Systems Co." 9 plaintiff brought a
Title VII action alleging discriminatory discharge, sexual harass-
ment, and retaliatory discharge.' 20 Plaintiff prevailed only on the
discriminatory discharge claim.' 2 ' In considering the question of
attorney's fees, the court found that plaintiff's attorney had
"presented a total array of claims wholly out of proportion to what
[the court] found to be meritorius," and that pursuing the unsuc-
cessful claims did not contribute to the success achieved.'2 Be-
cause plaintiff achieved "'only limited success' in comparison with
what she sought," the court reduced the fees award to an amount
"'reasonable in relation to the results obtained.' ,123
In Wabasha v. Solem' 2 4 the United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota used similar reasoning to exclude un-
successful claims from the fees award calculation.' 25 In Wabasha
plaintiffs filed a class action suit on behalf of all native American
inmates confined in the adjustment center of the South Dakota
Penitentiary.'2 6 Plaintiffs presented three major theories of relief:
(1) that conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual
punishment; (2) that procedures governing placement and deten-
tion violated procedural due process; and (3) that officials racially
discriminated in placement and confinement decisions.'2 7 Plaintiffs
only partially prevailed.'2'8 The court found that the "results ob-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 601 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1984).
120. Id. at 247.
121. Id. at 249-50. The court held that plaintiff failed to prove the claims of sexual
harrassment and retaliatory discharge. Id. at 250.
122. Id. at 255.
123. Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440).
124. 580 F. Supp. 448 (D.S.D. 1984).
125. Id. at 464.
126. Id. at 450. In the proceeding that addressed plaintiffs' fee request, the court sum-
marized Wabasha v. Solem, No. 79-4064 (D.S.D. Apr. 13, 1982), the unpublished memoran-
dum decision in the underlying action. See id.
127. Id. at 450, 464.
128. Id. at 464. Plaintiffs did not prevail on the racial discrimination claim. Regarding
the other claims, the court characterized plaintiffs' success as moderate. According to the
court, "only minor problems were found with respect to individual living conditions .. ..
The plaintiffs also did not completely succeed on all their due process allegations, but were
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tained . . . fell far short of the original goal" and that plaintiffs'
theories "were not based on a common core of facts [or] related
legal theories . . . . The theories presented . . . would each
achieve a different type of relief.'1 29 The court, therefore, deter-
mined that Hensley mandated a reduction of the fees award. 130
In Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago'' one plaintiff, who had
been arrested and strip searched for a misdemeanor offense, raised
claims of false arrest, excessive force, and unconstitutional treat-
ment,1 32 but prevailed only in challenging the strip search. 3 In
considering the appropriate fees award, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit attempted to refine the Hensley
standard to some extent. The court stated, "We believe a useful
tool for making this determination [of whether the claims arose
from a common core of facts] is to focus on whether the claims
seek relief for essentially the same course of conduct."' 34 The court
then denied a fees award that included time spent on the false ar-
rest and excessive force claims because plaintiff succeeded only on
the strip search claim. 13 5 The court applied its test narrowly, inter-
only moderately successful." Id.
129. Id. at 464-65.
130. Id. at 465. The court reduced the lodestar using a multiplier of 0.40. Id. at 465.
For the analyses of other courts that have narrowly interpreted Hensley, see, e.g., Sisco v.
J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 733 F.2d 55, 58 (8th Cir. 1984) (directing district court to exclude
hours spent on unsuccessful claims even though successful and unsuccessful claims were
"based on a common core of facts" and on legal theories "not unrelated"); Wojtkowski v.
Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 130 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that the unsuccessful claims against city
and police chief were distinct from successful claims against police officers for incident in-
volving plaintiff's arrest and detention); King v. McCord, 707 F.2d 466, 467 (11th Cir. 1983)
(per curiam) (upholding ruling that plaintiff's unsuccessful claims of discriminatory failure
to promote and discriminatory failure to rehire were "not sufficiently intertwined" with suc-
cessful claim under the Equal Pay Act); Jordan v. Dorsey, 587 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (excluding hours expended on behalf of named plaintiffs who were predecessors in
time to victorious low-income tenants despite attorneys' argument that time expended was
in pursuit of suit's central claim); Gates v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 581 F. Supp. 204,
211 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (holding discharged black employee not entitled to fees award that
included time spent on unsuccessful punitive damages claim and unsuccessful claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 because these claims were "separate and distinct" from success-
ful discriminatory discharge claim); Monahan v. State of Nebraska, 575 F. Supp. 132, 136-37
(D. Neb. 1983) (reducing lodestar figure by 40% because plaintiff's success was short lived
and limited).
131. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
132. Id. at 1267. Four plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the arrest and
search procedure, but only one raised the additional claims of false arrest and excessive
force. Id. at 1266-67.
133. Id. at 1279-80.
134. Id. at 1279.
135. Id. at 1279-80.
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preting the course of conduct surrounding the arrest as distinct
from the course of conduct surrounding the search." 6
B. Cases Allowing Fees Award to Include Unsuccessful Claims
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York followed a similar approach to Mary Beth G in Lyons v.
Cunningham,3 7 focusing on the set of facts from which the claims
arose.'38 Although this approach is very much like the "same
course of conduct" standard, the Lyons court reached a different
result than the Seventh Circuit reached in Mary Beth G.. In Lyons
plaintiffs prevailed in a civil rights suit filed after their son had
committed suicide in defendant's jail. Plaintiffs prevailed against
only two of nine defendants and the father failed to recover on his
claim as administrator of his son's estate." 9 The court, however,
did not reduce the fee award, reasoning that the plaintiffs pursued
the unsuccessful claims based "on a common set of facts-the
events which led to Larry Lyons' death.' ' 4 0 The claims also in-
volved similar legal issues.' 4 ' Although the court recognized that
the quantum of proof was different for the different allegations,
"the assertions that defendants violated plaintiffs' civil rights and
acted negligently [were] alternative means of presenting the same
claim."' 4 2
Similarly, in Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronau-
tics Board,143 the plaintiff successfully challenged the defendant's
1981 regulations concerning smoking aboard commercial aircraft."4
Defendant challenged the fees award, arguing that the lower court
136. Id.
137. 583 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
138. Id. at 1152.
139. Id. at 1152-53.
140. Id. at 1152. The court found that the plaintiffs had a "good faith basis" for the
claims against all the defendants who came into contact with decedent on the day he died.
"[Tihe jury's decision concerning [these defendants] 'is not a sufficient reason for reducing
[plaintiffs'] fee.'" Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435). The Lyons court also stated that
the plaintiffs' individual requests and Mr. Lyons' claim as administrator were related.
"[B]oth claims [were] based on the same set of facts." 583 F. Supp. at 1153.
The Lyons court's focus on whether the claims arose from the same set of facts is essen-
tially the same as focusing on "whether the claims [sought] relief for essentially the same
course of conduct." Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1279 (7th Cir. 1983).
The only difference lies in the Lyons court's broader view of that test.
141. Id. Both claims involved the New York survival statute. 583 F. Supp. at 1153.
142. Id. at 1152.
143. 724 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
144. See Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
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should have excluded hours spent on an unresolved challenge of
1979 regulations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia disagreed and held that the challenges to the
1979 and 1981 regulations involved "'a common core of facts' and
were 'based on related legal theories.' -1145 In reaching this conclu-
sion the court defined the common issues in light of their "consis-
tent argumentative theme: the rights of non-smoking airline pas-
sengers were . . . being inadequately protected.1' 46
IV. ANALYsis
A. Criticisms of Hensley and Progeny
These recent cases illustrate that the present standard under
Hensley for awarding attorney's fees to partially prevailing plain-
tiffs fails to remedy the wide disparity among fora. The Supreme
Court's attempt to provide definitive guidelines fails because the
145. Action on Smoking and Health, 724 F.2d at 215-16 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at
435). Although plaintiff sought fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No.
96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2325 (1982), the Supreme Court had declared that the standards set
forth in Hensley should apply to all cases in which Congress authorized an award of fees to
a prevailing party. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 n.7.
146. Action on Smoking and Health, 724 F.2d at 216. For the analyses of other courts
that have broadly interpreted Hensley, see, e.g., Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 175 (3d
Cir.) (upholding inclusion of time spent on depositions concerning unsuccessful claim be-
cause the depositions helped establish the successful due process claim), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 3513 (1984); Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1137 (11th Cir. 1984)
(instructing district court to include time spent on developing facts of unsuccessful hiring
and promotion claims if these facts were "probative" to the successful wage claim); Citizens
Council v. Brinegar, 741 F.2d 584, 595-96 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiffs were entitled
to fees for unsuccessful claims because all claims were "substantially related" and advanced
the same theory); Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983) (fees award not
reduced although the court dismissed one plaintiff, and two other plaintiffs received only
nominal damages because plaintiffs litigated the case as a "single action"), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1025 (1984); Webb v. County Bd. of Educ., 715 F.2d 254, 259-60 (6th Cir. 1983) (al-
though plaintiff obtained only individual relief, fees award not reduced for time spent pur-
suing class action because the individual and class allegations were "sufficiently related"),
aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1923 (1985); Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Common-
wealth, 581 F. Supp. 1412, 1420 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (exclusion of time spent on unsuccessful
claims held inappropriate because plaintiffs "won substantial relief"); Krodel v. Young, 576
F. Supp. 390, 396 (D.D.C. 1983) (fees award not reduced although plaintiff prevailed on only
one of five claims that alleged unconstitutional denial of five separate promotions because
plaintiff could have won back pay and reinstatement for only one denied promotion and
because the claims were based on a common core of facts), aff'd, 748 F.2d 701 (1984), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 62 (1985); McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 573 F. Supp. 976, 981
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (fees award not reduced for plaintiffs' unsuccessful attempt at class certifi-
cation); Monroe v. United Air Lines, 565 F. Supp. 274, 286 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (fees award not
reduced for time spent on unsuccessful preliminary injunction motion because plaintiffs
based motion on identical facts and legal theories that underpinned plaintiffs' success on
the merits).
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Hensley standard is too flexible. Splits among circuits continue as
courts interpret "related legal theories"' 47 and "common core of
facts' 14' either narrowly or broadly.'4 9 Some courts merely empha-
size the "limited success achieved" without considering the rela-
tionship among claims.' 50 Hensley, therefore, may be characterized
accurately as a "noncase" that provides no guidance on the com-
plex issue of attorney's fees.' 51 Moreover, the ambiguous standard
will lead to more appeals as dissatisfied parties attempt to find a
forum that applies Hensley in accordance with their interests. Jus-
tice Brennan foresaw Hensley's failure: "Ultimately, [the Fees
Act's] straightforward command is replaced by a vast body of arti-
ficial, judge-made doctrine. . . , which like a Frankenstein's mon-
ster meanders its well-intentioned way through the legal landscape
leaving waste and confusion (not to mention circuit splits) in its
wake."' 5
2
The Hensley opinion also disregards congressional intent. The
legislative history provides guidelines for determining fee awards,
but the Supreme Court failed to recognize this congressional guid-
ance.'15  Although the Supreme Court appropriately provided a
generous "prevailing party" standard and a workable, objective fig-
ure with which to begin the analysis of fees awards, 54 the Court's
147. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.
148. Id.
149. Compare, e.g., Wabasha v. Solem, 580 F. Supp. 448, 464 (D.S.D. 1984) (applying
the Hensley standard narrowly to find three claims concerning confinement in a detention
center not based on a common core of facts) with Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. 1147,
1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (reading Hensley broadly to find civil rights and negligence claims
against various defendants in a case involving a prison incident based on a common set of
facts).
150. See, e.g., cases discussed supra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
151. Interview with James Blumstein, Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University
School of Law, in Nashville, Tennessee (Oct. 1984). The Hensley standard fails to provide
adequate guidelines by which lower courts may assess the fees issue. On one hand, a court
may adopt a characterization of a case "as a single claim supported by several legal theo-
ries," in which case "the opinion of the court in Hensley would be eviscerated." Walton v.
Lehman, 570 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1983). On the other hand, a court may define
narrowly the Hensley standard and circumvent the policy goals of the Fees Act. See infra
text accompanying notes 168-77.
152. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 455 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
153. The Supreme Court in Hensley stated that the legislative history "does not pro-
vide a definitive answer as to the proper standard for setting a fee award where the plaintiff
has achieved only limited success." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431. But see supra notes 22-44 and
accompanying text.
154. The legislative history provides a generous formulation for the definition of pre-
vailing party. See supra note 6. The cases cited in the legislative history recognized that the
lodestar sum is the appropriate initial determination. See supra notes 31-44 and accompa-
nying text.
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focus on the relationship between successful and unsuccessful
claims misdirects the focus of an appropriate analysis. The Su-
preme Court justified the exclusion of unsuccessful, unrelated
claims from the fees calculation by stating that Congress intended
to exclude these claims when it authorized fees awards only to pre-
vailing parties. 155 The Court, however, admitted that the prevailing
party question is only the threshold determination. 156 Once a court
finds that a party has "prevailed" within the meaning of the Fees
Act, the legislative history requires compensation "'for all time
reasonably expended,' ",17 rather than compensation only for time
expended on a prevailing claim.15 8 In addition to this express direc-
tion in the legislative history, Congress cited approvingly a number
of cases that were to serve as guidelines for determining fees
awards.159 None of these cases required a reduction for time spent
on unsuccessful claims or implied that courts should consider the
relationship between successful and unsuccessful claims. Rather,
these cases based the fees awards on "all time reasonably ex-
pended."160 The appropriate focus in determining the fees awards,
therefore, is clearly the time reasonably expended in the case.
The Supreme Court's supplanting of congressional guidelines
with the Court's own guidelines reveals the Court's reluctance to
provide fees awards that are as broad as the legislative history
mandates.16' In so doing the Court ignored the primary policy
goals of the Fees Act.16 2 Congress sought to make civil rights cases
more attractive to private practitioners and to facilitate private en-
forcement of civil rights laws.16 3 Reducing an award for time spent
on "unrelated" claims may create a disincentive for an attorney to
accept a civil rights case unless taking the case involves little
risk. 1 4 If the potential of losing legitimate claims is high, the
155. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435; see supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
156. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
157. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 244, 246 (C.D. Cal. 1974)). One commentator argues that Stan-
ford Daily, 64 F.R.D. at 683, gave the only exception to this rule: only hours devoted to
"clearly meritless claims" should be excluded. E. LARSON, supra note 27, at 178.
158. See supra notes 58-60, 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing recognition that
courts were not to limit awards to time spent pursuing successful claims).
159. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text; see also . LARSON, supra note 27,
at 177-78.
161. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
162. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 444 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
163. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
164. Justice Brennan recognized the chilling effect that reduced awards and extended
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plaintiff's attorney risks being inadequately compensated for rea-
sonable time expended. The risk of nonpayment is especially great
when plaintiffs are low-income individuals. Low-income individu-
als, therefore, may have greater difficulty obtaining counsel to re-
present their interests, especially plaintiffs "with less-than-certain
prospects for success."'165 This distinct possibility under Hensley
contravenes the fundamental purpose of the Fees Act-attracting
adequate counsel for civil rights plaintiffs who could not otherwise
afford to pursue their claims. 166 The Court's decision may accentu-
ate the chilling effect on private enforcement in a geographic area
where private enforcement is most essential-an area where a
judge or jury may be unsympathetic to claims of unconstitutional
discrimination. The Hensley standard also may compromise a cli-
ent's interests even after he has procured representation. A reduc-
tion in a fees award for time spent on unsuccessful claims "may
* . * invite overly conservative tactics or even prohibit some high-
risk but deserving actions entirely."'61 7 This inhibitive effect on le-
gitimate claims clearly would frustrate congressional objectives.
The cases that narrowly interpret Hensley exemplify how
courts can manipulate the ambiguous standard and undermine the
goals of the Fees Act. The most atrocious abuse of Hensley's flexi-
bility occurred in Mandhare v. W.S. LaFargue Elementary
School. 68 Plaintiff's unsuccessful claims for back pay and equita-
ble relief necessarily arose from the same circumstances on which
plaintiff based the successful reinstatement claim, but the unsym-
pathetic court ignored this fact. More importantly, the legitimacy
of the unsuccessful claims in Mandhare cannot be questioned.'6 9
litigation over fees awards would have on attorneys. See supra notes 104-07 and accompany-
ing text.
Although the majority in Hensley asserted that cases involving unrelated claims likely
would be infrequent, Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, lower courts often have reduced fee awards
by declaring claims unrelated. See supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text. The risk of a
reduced award, therefore, is a realistic concern.
165. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
166. In many civil rights cases "the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little
or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil
rights ... citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs to them to vindicate
these rights in court." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
167. Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted) (addressing
the attorney's fees issue in a securities common fund case); see also Northcross v. Board of
Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979) (asserting that a reduction in fees for time spent on
unsuccessful claims will "discourage innovative and vigorous lawyering"), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 911 (1980).
168. 605 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. La. 1985); see supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
169. Title VII expressly includes claims for back pay and equitable relief among the
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Plaintiff's attorney arguably had an ethical duty to assert these
claims. 170 Although the time spent pursuing the unsuccessful
claims was time reasonably expended, the flexibility of Hensley al-
lowed the court to emphasize the limited success achieved and to
reduce the fees award accordingly.1 71 The Mandhare court, there-
fore, undermined the goals of the Fees Act in an abusive situation
that demanded the Fees Act's strictest enforcement.172
In Leverett v. Town of Limon 73 the court reduced the fees
award for time spent on an unsuccessful substantive due process
claim despite plaintiffs' success on a procedural due process
claim.174 The court focused on the distinct remedies that plaintiffs
sought with each claim. 75 The court manipulated the ambiguous
guidelines in Hensley by emphasizing the limited success achieved
without recognizing that the two due process claims were related
legal theories arising from a common core of facts. In the vast ma-
jority of due process challenges, plaintiff's counsel reasonably may
assert both procedural and substantive violations17 6 and a failure
to raise both these issues may constitute inadequate representation
appropriate remedies for unlawful employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
170. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility requires that an attorney re-
present his client zealously. A lawyer must not "fail to seek the lawful objectives of his
client through reasonably available means." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSiBiLrrY
DR 7-101(A)(1) (1981) (footnote omitted). Thus, a lawyer is under an ethical duty to assert
legitimate claims that advance his client's interests. Under the Hensley standard, a lawyer
may confront a difficult decision of which claims to assert. In asserting a legitimate but
distinct claim, the lawyer may face a high risk of nonpayment; if he fails to assert the claim,
however, he may face ethical sanctions. A litigant's ignorance of how a court will use the
Hensley guidelines in assessing the relationship among his claims, see infra notes 186-90
and accompanying text, will exacerbate this difficulty.
171. See Mandhare, 605 F. Supp. at 243.
172. The court found several indications of discrimination, see supra note 111, but
refused to award a fee that would compensate plaintiff's counsel adequately. In a geographic
area where such abusive discrimination persists, private enforcement will occur only with
adequate compensation. The Mandhare court provided a disincentive for private represen-
tation of civil rights plaintiffs.
173. 567 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1983); see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
174. Leverett, 567 F. Supp. at 475.
175. Id.
176. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 485 (9th ed.
1975) (asserting that while the "most obvious ingredient" of the due process guarantee is
procedural, the Court also has found in the due process guarantee certain constitutional
restraints on the substantive ordering of rights and duties--"a restraint on the content as
well as the methods of governmental action"). The legitimacy of both procedural and sub-
stantive claims in a due process challenge is especially apparent when the claims involve
personal liberty interests. See id. (noting the decline of substantive due process protection
of economic and property rights).
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in many instances. 17 7 The court in Leverett failed to compensate
plaintiffs' counsel for all time reasonably expended. Leverett,
therefore, serves as another example of how Hensley allows courts
to contravene legislative intent.
Not all cases that have narrowly applied Hensley, however,
have achieved a result inconsistent with the Fees Act. In Ryan v.
Raytheon Data Systems Co. 178 the related claims of discriminatory
discharge, sexual harrassment, and retaliatory discharge necessa-
rily arose from a common core of facts-plaintiff's employment
and discharge. The court, however, reduced the fees award appro-
priately because the time expended on the unsuccessful claims was
not reasonable. The court held that the unsuccessful claims were
"nonmeritorious'1 7 9 and in no way contributed to plaintiff's suc-
cess.180 Had the court followed Hensley's guidance and awarded
fees for time expended on all related claims that arose from a com-
mon core of facts,181 the resulting fees award would have provided
plaintiff's counsel with a windfall. The court's narrow application
of Hensley preserved the balance of the Fees Act.
The Ryan case demonstrates the misdirected focus of the
Hensley standard. If courts apply the Hensley standard strictly,
the balance between providing adequate compensation to attract
competent counsel and preventing windfalls to attorneys depends
solely on a court's characterization of a claim as being related or
unrelated to an unsuccessful claim. If the court in Ryan wished to
achieve the same correct result while applying Hensley, the court
would have had to defy reason and find that the claims were unre-
lated. The claims were related but time spent on the nonmeritori-
ous claims did not deserve compensation because this time was not
reasonably expended. The Hensley standard, therefore, misses the
point: the relationship among claims in no way determines whether
the time expended on the claims was reasonable.
Although a broad application of Hensley in Ryan would have
created a windfall to plaintiff's counsel, most cases that have
broadly applied the Hensley standard to include more hours in the
fees award calculation have followed more closely the purpose of
the Fees Act. In general, adequate compensation decreases the pos-
177. See supra note 170.
178. 601 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1984); see supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
179. Ryan, 601 F. Supp. at 255.
180. Id.
181. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.
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sibility of compromised claims"8 2 and provides the congressionally
mandated incentive for private counsel to enforce civil rights legis-
lation.18 3 These broad interpretations, however, possess a serious
flaw. As Ryan indicates, a broad view of "common core of facts"
and "related legal theories" could encompass nonmeritorious
claims. Courts, however, should not include the time spent on
these claims when making the fees calculation because this time is
not reasonably expended. These broad interpretations, by poten-
tially compensating attorneys for pursuing nonmeritorious claims,
allow attorneys to pad their bills. A broad interpretation, there-
fore, could wreak havoc on the delicate balance of the Fees Act.184
The wide discretion available under the Hensley standard fails
to provide much-needed foresight. The ambiguous guidelines force
litigants to proceed in a complex case 8 5 with no knowledge of how
the court will determine the fees award. A litigant might rely on a
previous interpretation by the immediate court, but the possibility
of a different characterization haunts him. This uncertainty in-
creases the chances of compromised claims and decreases the
chances for settlement.1 6 The possibility of a different characteri-
zation also provides incentive to appeal an unfavorable award,
which leads to protracted litigation of the least socially productive
sort.8" All of these problems with the Hensley ruling clearly
demonstrate the need for a new procedure and standard that will
provide definitive guidelines and comply with congressional intent.
B. Proposal
The appropriate standard for awarding attorney's fees to par-
tially prevailing plaintiffs must conform to congressional intent as
manifested in the legislative history of the Fees Act. This basic
tenet of statutory construction is especially compelling in the con-
text of attorney's fees because only Congress can authorize fee
182. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 2.
184. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
185. Civil rights litigation is complicated in and of itself; attorney's fees issues exacer-
bate that complexity. See, e.g., Dickerson v. City Bank & Trust Co., 590 F. Supp. 714, 719-
20 (D. Kan. 1984) (recognizing the "confused and protracted nature of this litigation on the
attorney's fees issue"); Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 581
F. Supp. 1412, 1420 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (calling the litigation leading to the fees request "com-
plex and prolonged").
186. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
187. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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shifting among litigants.188 Courts, therefore, must determine fees
awards in the manner that Congress authorized. The legislative
history of the Fees Act expressly requires compensation for all
time reasonably expended on the case.189 This standard serves the
goals of the Fees Act by granting fees awards that are adequate to
attract competent counsel for civil rights plaintiffs without produc-
ing windfalls for attorneys.190 Thus, in determining whether to in-
clude a partially prevailing attorney's time spent pursuing unsuc-
cessful claims, courts should focus on whether the time spent
pursuing the claims was reasonably expended.
The Hensley standard's focus on the relationship between the
claims and the ultimate success achieved is misdirected because
the relationship among claims does not determine the reasonable-
ness of the time expended. 191 Another suggested standard would
compensate a plaintiff's attorney for work on all nonfrivolous
claims. 92 Countervailing considerations reveal that this approach
also would be both impractical and inconsistent with legislative in-
tent. The history of decisions under the Fees Act reveals a con-
servative tendency among some courts in awarding fees,' 93 and
these courts would be very reluctant to adopt such a broad stan-
dard. More importantly, a standard that compensates for work on
all nonfrivolous claims would upset the balance of the Fees Act by
over-emphasizing the compensation of prevailing plaintiffs' attor-
neys. 194 This broad standard clearly increases the likelihood of
windfalls to attorneys by encompassing more claims in the fees cal-
culation. Furthermore, by focusing on whether the claims were
frivolous, this standard raises the stakes of fee shifting. Because a
defendant may receive a fees award for time spent defending frivo-
lous claims, 95 the court would face an "all or nothing" decision.
188. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying note 23.
190. See supra note 24.
191. See supra text following note 181 (discussing Hensley's misdirected focus in con-
text of Ryan case).
192. See E. LARSON, supra note 27, at 177-78.
193. See id. at 162. Some courts may disagree with the policy behind the Fees Act or
"harbor an inherent dislike for public interest cases." Id. The traditional "American Rule"
may influence other courts to use their discretion to limit fee shifting. See id. at 162-63.
194. "If attorneys representing civil rights plaintiffs do not expect to receive full com-
pensation . . . , or if they feel they can 'lard' winning cases with additional work solely to
augment their fees, the balance struck by [the Fees Act] goes awry." Hensley, 461 U.S. at
447 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). For a discussion of Congress' fear of giving a "blank
check" to plaintiffs' attorneys, see supra notes 5 and text accompanying note 22.
195. "A prevailing defendant may recover an attorney's fee . . . where the suit was
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Reducing a plaintiff's fee request necessarily would make the
plaintiff liable for the defendant's costs in defending the frivolous
claim and could lead to ethical sanctions against the plaintiff's at-
torney for asserting the frivolous claim.196 A court, therefore, might
be reluctant to reduce a fees award. Thus, a standard based on
nonfrivolous claims would increase the likelihood of windfalls to
attorneys in two different respects and, consequently, would con-
travene legislative intent.197
The appropriate focus in determining whether the time ex-
pended pursuing a claim was reasonable is not whether the claim
was related to a successful claim, nor whether the claim was frivo-
lous, but whether the claim was legitimate. In this regard, Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an aid to resolving
the problems of fee shifting. The rule allows a court to call a pre-
trial conference for "[tihe simplification of the issues . . . [and]
[s]uch other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. 1 98
In a conference preceding a civil rights action, the court could al-
low the defendant to challenge any claim of the plaintiff, and the
court then could consider the challenge under a "questionable
merit" standard. This standard properly focuses on the legitimacy
of claims rather than on the relationship among claims. Further-
more, a "questionable merit" standard eliminates the necessity of
ruling that a claim is completely meritless or frivolous and thereby
allows a court to view the claims objectively without ethical
overtones. 99
Under this standard, if the court declared in the pretrial con-
ference that the defendant's challenge was unwarranted, the plain-
tiff could proceed with the certainty that, if he were to prevail at
vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarass the defendant." Hensley, 461 U.S. at
429 n.2; see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
196. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
"[ffile a suit, assert a position ... or take other action" when he knows or obviously should
know that such action would serve merely to harass another. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1981). Furthermore, a lawyer shall not knowingly advance a
claim "that is unwarranted under existing law" unless he can support the action by a "good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Id. at DR 7-102
(A)(2).
197. In addition to increasing the likelihood of windfalls to attorneys, an all or nothing
approach to the fees issue creates a risk of no fees being awarded to partially prevailing
plaintiffs. A court that disagreed with the goals of the Fees Act or that adhered faithfully to
the "American Rule" might disallow compensation entirely rather than allow a broad award
for all nonfrivolous claims.
198. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(1), (11).
199. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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trial, the court would compensate for time reasonably spent on all
claims. 00 If the judge found that a claim was of "questionable
merit," the plaintiff would proceed at risk, but at a risk that he
would understand fully. If the plaintiff lost on the claim and the
court after hearing all the evidence did not change its ruling that
the claim was of questionable merit, the court would not compen-
sate the plaintiff for time expended in pursuit of the claim.20 1 If
the plaintiff prevailed on the claim, however, the court not only
would compensate for the time expended, but also should award an
upward adjustment because the risk involved in asserting the claim
deserves consideration in the fees calculation. 0 2 In addition, the
potential for an upward adjustment will deter defendants from in-
discriminately challenging all claims 03 and will deter multiple
challenges. If a court rules that a claim is of questionable merit,
200. The plaintiff's fee request will remain subject to a reasonableness standard. A
court may eliminate hours spent on duplicative effort or hours expended by an inexperi-
enced attorney, but hours expended on legitimate, unsuccessful claims will not be excluded
completely.
201. If a plaintiff chooses to pursue a claim that the court has ruled questionable, the
court later may consider whether to compensate the defendant for time spent defending the
claim in trial and for time spent challenging the claim in the pretrial conference. If a plain-
tiff chooses not to pursue the claim, an award to the defendant is inappropriate.
202. Justice Brennan has argued that courts should consider "the prelitigation likeli-
hood that the claims which did in fact prevail would prevail. . . . If the rate used. . . does
not already include some factor for risk. . . , it ought to be enhanced by some percentage
figure." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 449 & n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); see also Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 902 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring) (reaffirming view that Congress
"has clearly indicated that the risk of not prevailing" is a proper basis for an upward adjust-
ment because majority leaves question unresolved).
The Sixth Circuit recognized the need for an upward adjustment to account for risk in
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911
(1980). The court stated:
Perhaps the most significant factor in [civil rights] cases which at times renders the
routine hourly fee unreasonably low is the fact that the award is contingent upon suc-
cess. An attorney's regular hourly billing is based upon an expectation of payment, win,
lose or draw. If he or she will only be paid in the event of victory, those rates will be
adjusted upward to compensate for the risk. . .of not being paid at all.
Id. at 638; see also Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that the
law should entitle lawyers whose compensation depends on victory to a greater fee than
those lawyers to whom the law assures compensation regardless of outcome); Lindy Bros.
Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 113 (3d Cir.
1976) (upholding the substantially increased award because of risk entailed).
203. To further prevent defendants from challenging all claims, courts should compen-
sate attorneys of prevailing plaintiffs for time spent preparing for and participating in the
pretrial conference. Courts should not be reluctant to make upward adjustments because
the concern for over-compensation is less compelling at present than the concern for inade-
quate compensation, especially because the latter threatens the main goal of the Fees
Act-compensation adequate to induce attorneys to represent civil rights plaintiffs. See
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 448-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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the plaintiff may choose not to litigate the claim. 0 4 If a plaintiff,
however, chooses not to pursue a truly questionable claim, this
procedure will serve the goal of limiting insubstantial litigation.
Ryan v. Raytheon Data Systems Co.2°5 provides an appropri-
ate fact situation for demonstrating how this procedure and new
standard will alleviate problems in the complex area of fee shifting
without upsetting the balance of the Fees Act. The court in Ryan
found that the claims of sexual harassment and retaliatory dis-
charge were "nonmeritorious. '20 6 Assuming the court determines at
the pretrial conference that these claims would fail under a ques-
tionable merit standard,20 7 the plaintiff would not expect compen-
sation for time expended on these claims if he pursued them and
lost. The plaintiff's fee request would be reduced, and the likeli-
hood of settlement would increase. If the plaintiff won on these
claims, the defendant would understand that the plaintiff is enti-
tled to an increased award for the risk involved in pursuing the
claims. The court, therefore, would facilitate settlement because
the parties would understand the consequences of the court's char-
acterization of claims.
More importantly, this procedure would promote the goals of
the Fees Act. Plaintiff's counsel could not pad his bill with ques-
tionable claims and litigate extensively the fees issue in pursuit of
a windfall. This check on the plaintiff would alleviate defendants'
fears of excessive fees awards. 208 Plaintiff's counsel, however, would
know that time reasonably expended on all legitimate claims would
receive compensation. This procedure, therefore, preserves the ap-
propriate incentive for representation of civil rights plaintiffs.
This procedure and new standard will resolve the problems
that Hensley created and preserve the delicate balance of the Fees
Act by following legislative intent and by providing a market force
204. See Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937, 957 & n.31 (D. Conn. 1984) (indicating
that because claim was of "doubtful validity" plaintiffs chose not to pursue it). A court
should be aware that an unfavorable ruling may thwart legitimate claims and should use
caution in making its ruling.
205. 601 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1984); see supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
206. Ryan, 601 F. Supp. at 255.
207. If these claims did survive the questionable merit standard, all parties would un-
derstand that if plaintiff prevailed, the court's fees award would compensate plaintiff's
counsel for all time reasonably expended pursuing these claims. The court may exclude
hours that are duplicative or excessive in light of the skill required; the court will consider
"billing judgment" as a component in fee setting. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The court, how-
ever, would consider these factors concerning all claims rather than only the successful
claims.
208. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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approach to fee shifting. 09 The legitimacy of the claim, rather than
on the relationship among claims, will determine the fees award.
Even if courts must continue to operate under the Hensley stan-
dard, using a pretrial conference on the fees issue will aid courts
and litigants. Although Hensley contravenes legislative intent, the
procedure will alleviate some problems because a court could in-
form litigants which claims the court will consider distinct and un-
related. Regardless of the standard, the litigants' knowledge of the
court's approach to the fees award will eliminate confusion, re-
strain appeals, and facilitate settlement.210 This procedure also will
help the parties and the court control the complex question of fees
from the outset of the litigation. This market force approach pro-
vides an initiative among the parties and the court to help them
deal effectively and knowledgeably with the inherent tension in the
Fees Act-the tension between attracting competent counsel
through compensation and preventing windfalls to attorneys.
V. CONCLUSION
The inherent tension in the Fees Act requires a standard that
delicately balances the need to provide civil rights plaintiffs ade-
quate access to the judicial system with the concern of preventing
windfalls to attorneys. The Supreme Court's reluctance in Hensley
to follow Congress' broad mandate in awarding attorney's fees
threatens the primary goal behind passage of the Fees Act. More-
over, the Hensley standard adds confusion and ambiguity to an
already complex field and fails to remedy the disparity among cir-
cuits. Without a reassessment of the standard for awarding fees to
partially prevailing plaintiffs, litigation over attorney's fees will in-
crease and will continue to divert judicial resources to socially un-
productive endeavors.21' The "Frankenstein's monster" of pro-
tracted litigation212 must be tamed by a new standard and
procedure that reinstates the precarious balance of the Fees Act
209. This Recent Development refers to the initiative among litigants and the court as
a "market force approach" because the procedure allows the litigants and the court to con-
trol the fees issue and the extent of the litigation. The parties also can alleviate their respec-
tive fears involved in fee shifting. See supra text accompanying note 199.
210. "A request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation. Ide-
ally, of course, litigants will settle the amount of a fee." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Hensley
paradoxically undermines this goal by establishing an ambiguous standard.
211. Justice Brennan called appeals from awards of attorney's fees "one of the least
socially productive types of litigation imaginable." Id. at 442 (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part).
212. See supra note 105 and text accompanying note 152.
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and that provides parties with the ability to maintain that balance.
The new standard should focus on the legitimacy of the claims
rather than on the relationship among the claims, and the most
efficient procedure for implementing this standard and controlling
the fees issue is a pretrial conference. This new standard and pro-
cedure will enable courts and litigants to better handle the com-
plex fees question that otherwise will threaten to dwarf the original
litigation, and will most effectively serve the goals of the Fees Act.
TIM K. GARRETT
